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Abstract:  
 
The capital structure puzzle still remains unsolved. Every year there are many incidences of 
firms, reporting very high and risky levels of debt ratios. Since debt has tax advantages over 
other sources of capital, this paper employs simulated marginal tax rate (MTR) and its 
variants to study the tax effects on leverage ratios of profitable Indian companies. The paper 
analyses three different measures of leverage; debt to asset (DAR) ratio, incremental debt to 
total assets ratio (DINC) and debt to capital employed (DAR1) ratio. For each measure of 
leverage ratio, different specifications based on four variants of MTR have been considered. 
The results confirm significant tax effects on debt ratios of profitable Indian companies. It 
was found that DINC is highly autoregressive and independent variables considered in this 
paper explain around 55% of the variation in DAR1. The study suggests a new measure of 
retained earnings (ERTA).  
Key words: Marginal tax Rate, debt, leverage, capital structure, tax, incremental debt, debt to 
equity ratio, capital employed, corporate finance, financial distress 
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   1. Introduction: 
 
In the area of corporate finance, capital structure decision is one of the core functions of a 
financial manager. It is one of the most important decisions which is irreversible, has long 
term impact and thus, has its bearing on the survival of the company. Modigliani and 
Miller’s (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) prominent work gave much popularity to the issue of 
corporate capital structure. Since then commendable research work has been done in this 
field by countries all over the world, the seminal papers in this regard are that of (DeAngelo 
& Masulis, 1980), (Shum, 1996), (Mackie-Mason, 1990), (Shevlin, 1990), (Graham, 1996a) 
to name a few. 
Capital Structure choice mainly comprises of debt or equity. The basic difference between 
the two arises out of the nature of cash flow claims that each type of financing demands. 
Other differences flow from the tax and legal laws of different countries. Each source has its 
set of advantages and disadvantages. Tax deductibility of interest might sometimes reduce 
the cost of debt to a great extent. This feature makes it attractive in comparison to equity 
and other sources of finance. But the accompanying threat of bankruptcy reduces its 
magnetism; it furthers a conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. Apart from 
these, managers’ discretion and company policies in decision making may sometimes play a 
major role in the choice of particular source of finance. Owing to this fact, capital structure 
still remains a puzzle.  
Till the beginning of 1990’s, researches could not empirically support the hypotheses that 
there exists a relationship between taxes and leverage. During 1990’s some work began to 
show; following which, now many researchers in other countries have identified significant 
impact of taxes on debt. The common feature of most of these studies is that they have used 
marginal tax rate (MTR) proxy to understand the debt movements. The simulated MTR 
based on Graham - Shevlin methodology is in fact considered to be one of the best proxies 
for marginal tax rate till now (De Mooij, 2011), (Graham, 1996b). 
In India, some work has emerged recently on this topic. The studies focus on identifying the 
determinants of the corporate financial structure. In these studies tax is only one of the 
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determinants of capital structure and has been included by way of not so efficient proxies
1
. 
The results reported are mixed.  
To capture the tax effects, we have used simulated marginal tax rates based on Graham -  
Shevlin methodology (Graham, 1996a). The rates have been calculated using MATLAB 
code (allowing for 10,000 simulations), developed in (Sinha & Bansal, 2012). The authors 
have developed the MATLAB codes for two algorithms to calculate marginal tax rate. The 
algorithms based on Graham – Shevlin methodology have been modified to incorporate the 
Indian tax code and rules such as minimum alternate tax (MAT) and loss carry forward. 
Both the algorithms are similar to each other with the difference only, in the part of series 
being simulated. In Algorithm1 the whole taxable income series is simulated and then the 
tax rules are applied to calculate marginal tax rate. In Algorithm 2 only the future stream of 
taxable income series is simulated. Thus we have used four variants of marginal tax rate 
based on difference in algorithms and underlying series on which tax rates have been 
calculated. 
Another common issue in studies pertaining to leverage is identifying the appropriate 
measure of leverage.  Researchers have proposed that debt to equity ratio is not an efficient 
measure of leverage, as it may contain the cumulative effects of decisions taken in the past. 
Instead they have proposed to study incremental financing decisions. Jeffrey K. Mackie-
Mason (Mackie-Mason, 1990) is one of the early proponents of this idea and employs a 
zero-one event (choice of debt over equity) to study leverage changes. (Graham, 1996a) 
discusses in detail how debt equity ratio leads to the problem of endogeneity and uses 
change in debt deflated by lagged market value of firm as a measure of leverage. (Alworth 
& Arachi, 2001) uses change in debt to lagged value of total assets ratio for the study. 
(Welch, 2011) argues that debt to asset ratio is an inappropriate measure to capture changes 
in leverage because total assets are inclusive of non financial liabilities. As a result non 
financial liabilities are treated same as equity especially when the ratio is to be used for 
capital structure studies. Instead, the author proposes the use of debt to capital employed 
ratio in such studies. Hence based on the existing literature and to enable comparison in 
Indian context, this paper employs three measures of leverage by considering debt or 
incremental debt in the numerator and total assets (net of revaluation reserve and 
miscellaneous expenditure not written off)  or capital employed in the denominator.  
                                                          
1
 In (Graham, 1996b)the author has tested various proxies for marginal tax rate and found simulated 
marginal tax rate to be the best proxy for true marginal tax rate. 
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We suggest a new measure of retained earnings, excess return on total assets (ERTA), 
which has not been used earlier in any study as per our knowledge. Unlike profitability, 
retained earnings are a direct measure of additional internal funds available in an 
organization. According to the pecking order theory managers prefer debt, only after 
retained earnings are exhausted; as a consequence this measure is expected to influence the 
issuance of debt directly.  
The present study attempts to fill the gap in Indian studies by modelling the debt- tax 
relationship of 234 profitable Indian companies over the period of 22 years, using various 
tax variables and other control variables. The results indicate significant tax impact on 
leverage decisions of the firm.   
Rest of the paper proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and section 3 states the 
significance of the study. Section 4 discusses the model, variables and hypothesis. Section 5 
presents the results and observations. Section 6 presents the findings and recommendations 
followed by limitations and scope of future research in section 7 and conclusion in section 
8. 
 
  2. Review of literature: 
 
Since the development made by (Modigliani & Miller, 1958), many researchers have tried 
to prove the debt tax relationship by using numerous methodologies but, consistent results 
could not be achieved before the end of 1980’s. (Myers, 1984) mentions the need for the 
study that may be able to prove the relationship between taxes and debt policy of the firm. 
The main reasons identified behind the inability to prove the relationship were lack of 
variation in time series data of tax rates and non availability of appropriate tax proxy. The 
following review shows how the debt tax relationship has been tested and hence, research 
on capital structure has evolved over a period of time. 
(DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980) is one of the commendable contributions to the field of 
knowledge. The authors develop an optimal leverage model of capital structure and claim 
that presence of non debt tax shields or debt substitutes leads to a unique optimal leverage 
decision by each firm.  
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(Auerbach, 1985) and (Barclay, Smith, & Watts, 1995) takes the lead from Modigliani and 
Miller irrelevance propositions. (Auerbach, 1985) focuses on the information asymmetries 
and its impact on the issue – investment decisions. (Barclay, Smith, & Watts, 1995) 
suggests that the form of investment opportunities have an impact on the leverage ratios and 
finds out that tangibility is positively related with leverage. The author thus attempts to 
explain the reason behind corporate financing choices by firms through the problem solving 
methodology.  
(Shum, 1996) studies the provincial and time variations in corporate tax rate in Canada and 
uses the tax rates to study an impact on debt policy of Canadian firms. The author finds debt 
asset ratio to be highly autoregressive.  
(Graham, 1996a) addresses various shortcomings highlighted by (Myers & Majluf, 1984), 
(Mackie-Mason, 1990), (Shevlin, 1990) and (Scholes & Wolfson, 1992). The author 
explicitly calculates company specific marginal tax rate for the first time, by including 
investment tax credits and minimum alternate tax features to methodology developed by 
(Shevlin, 1990). Since its development, the methodology has been used by many authors to 
study debt tax relationships in different countries. Till now it is now considered to be the 
most appropriate proxy for true Marginal tax rate (MTR) (Graham, 1996b). The study has 
been conducted on 10,000 compustat firms and the results show that 15% of the debt policy 
changes could be explained by the tax effects. 
(Alworth & Arachi, 2001) examines the role of taxes on the use of debt by analysing 
incremental financial decisions, the author analyzes panel data on 1054 Italian firms to 
conclude that irrespective of the vast differences in the structure of the financial systems, 
taxes are  important for corporate financial decisions, the author identified significant cross 
sectional tax effects on debt policy. 
(Bhaduri, 2002) seeks to analyze various measures of debt depending upon the maturity 
structure to identify the factors influencing the choice of capital structure. The results 
confirm that the presence of restructuring costs in attaining the optimal capital structure is 
an important consideration. The author tests the dynamic model and has employed factor 
analytic technique to conduct the analysis.  The results suggest that the factors of growth, 
cash flow, size, product and industry characteristics influence the optimal capital structure 
choice. The study identifies that the speed of adjustment is higher towards the short term 
borrowing.  
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(Bernasconi, Marenzi, & Pagani, 2005) also, finds a significant relationship between tax 
changes and debt. The author by undertaking a comparative analysis of 3 different 
categories of non debt tax shield introduced in Italy during 1995 and 1999. The study 
employs the methodology suggested by (Mackie-Mason, 1990) . 
(Gill & Mathur, 2011) investigates the factors influencing the financial leverage of the 
Canadian manufacturing and service firms . The study employs correlational and non 
experimental research design to conduct the analyses. Results imply that collateralized 
assets, profitability, effective tax rate, size and growth opportunities are significant in 
determining the corporate debt level. 
(Kunieda, Takahata, & Yada, 2012) tests the model of debt and taxes using Graham -
Shevlin methodology on Japanese firms, they also finds a significant relationship between 
the two. 
 
3. Significance of the study: 
 
The main focus of capital structure decision is to decide the optimal mix of debt and equity. 
Therefore, the expected outcome of this decision is the determination of the capital structure 
that maximises the value of the company by minimizing the weighted average cost of capital.  
It is well known that the tax system creates a bias towards debt when compared to equity by 
allowing interest to be tax deductible. This tax advantage of debt reduces the cost of 
borrowing on debt. Hence, debt proves to be a cheaper source of finance. The debt bias may 
result in serious implications for corporate and the economy. Companies may indulge in 
excessive debt issuance without considering the risk factors associated with it, which may 
lead to wasting of resources along with the risk of bankruptcy. (Majumdar & Sen, 2011) 
observes that companies in India have high debt to equity ratio, whereas in the west the ratio 
moves around a number which is little more than half of nominal value of equity.  
Recent financial crises, international trade and other important developments in the field of 
capital structure point towards the danger to economy (De Mooij, 2011). This issue is now a 
concern for authorities worldwide. 
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Therefore, keeping in mind India’s current state of corporate debt it becomes worthwhile to 
find out that, whether high debt ratios in India can be explained by debt biasness? 
As important as the question, are the measures and methods used to counter it. Since decades, 
continuous efforts are being put, to identify the correct measure of leverage to study the debt 
– tax relationship. Researchers record contradictory results and thus, no consensus has been 
achieved on this issue till now. It is very important to conduct research under correct set of 
realistic assumptions, and employ correct and reliable measures of dependent and 
independent variables, to draw meaningful conclusions from results. As far as possible, all 
the relevant factors should be carefully identified to achieve the most precise results.  
Hence, through our study we strive to address these issues and make an effort to answer the 
question, mentioned above, in the most meaningful way. 
 
4. The Model: 
 
On the basis of existing theories and the research work undertaken the relationship between 
tax and debt can be expressed as follows.   
Debt = f (tax, risk, credit worthiness, free cash availability, retained earnings, growth, 
size, target /optimum debt ratio) 
 
Each factor has been discussed in detail below: 
4.1. The Dependent variable 
Debt or leverage:  
Studies have used various measures of leverage. The most common are debt as a proportion 
of equity, as a proportion of book value of debt and market value of equity, or as a proportion 
of total assets. There are various variants of the numerator also, these are first difference in 
the book value of debt, book value of short term loan, long term loan, loan taken from bank 
etc: 
The debt to equity ratio has been criticized in the literature for carrying over the effects of 
past decisions and thus researchers have proposed the use of incremental financing to 
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undertake the analysis (Mackie-Mason, 1990), (Graham, 1996a). Depending upon the data 
availability, the specific objective and the recent developments the following three measures 
of debt have been used in our study. 
1) Change in debt to asset ratio (DAR): this measure incorporates not only change in debt but 
also change in total assets, here we assume that a firm maintains a target debt to asset ratio to 
keep risk under control. 
2) Incremental debt (first difference in debt) to lagged value of total asset ratio (DINC): this 
ratio has also been employed by (Alworth & Arachi, 2001). This is more suitable under the 
assumption that corporate does not have any target ratio, but we feel this ratio may also carry 
the effects of past decisions as we use the lagged value of total assets. 
 3) Change in debt to capital employed ratio (DAR1): This is calculated as the first difference 
in the ratio of debt to capital employed, proposed by (Welch, 2011)  
The following graphs show the behaviour of corporate debt in India: 
 
Fig 1: Graph showing total debt employed by the companies used in the study for analysis. 
A simple look at graph 1 will give us an impression that the debt levels are rising over a 
period of time except during some periods (it has been discussed in the data section). So we 
may assume that in India debt levels are quiet high and might be concerned about the 
riskiness involved. But it would be wrong to come to a conclusion on the basis of the study of 
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debt figures in isolation. Thus we have plotted 3 other graphs to understand how debt has 
behaved as a part of different measures of total capital.  
 
Fig 2: Graph showing the proportion of debt and shareholder’s funds in capital employed for 
all the companies taken together  
 
 
Fig 3: Graph showing the proportion of debt, capital raised from external sources
2
 (refer 
footnote 2) and retained earnings in the total capital employed.   
                                                          
2
 Here total capital raised from external sources is taken as the sum total of equity, preferred stock and debt.   
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Fig 4: Graph showing the proportion of debt and other sources in the total capital raised from 
external sources.  
Total Capital can be divided in two parts, one that is created through external sources such as 
debt, equity and preferred capital and the other that is created through internal source in the 
form of retained earnings. Thus on the basis of data availability and definitions given in 
CMIE Prowess, we have attempted to study debt as a proportion of total capital (fig 2 & 3 ) 
and as a proportion of total capital raised from external sources only (fig 4) .  
Figure 2 shows a declining proportion of debt when compared with shareholders funds over a 
period of time. From 50% it has reduced to around 35% in 20 years time, Some light on 
above observations can be thrown by dividing shareholders funds into retained earnings and 
other capital raised from outside sources. This is shown in figure 3. Here we find that the 
proportion of retained earnings has increased from 25% to 50 %, this shows the preference of 
managers for retained earnings (when available) and appears to be one of the the reasons 
behind declining debt proportion in total capital employed; this is in accordance with pecking 
order theory. It is hard to say that the next preference of managers is debt. This information 
flows from figure 4, where we observe that the proportion of debt in the total capital raised 
from outside sources is maintained around 70% over a period of time. This analysis brings 
out two important indicators affecting leverage ratios, one is retained earnings and the other 
one is average debt ratios. These are expected to affect the leverage ratios significantly. 
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4.2. Explanatory variables: 
4.2.1 Tax variables: 
i) Marginal tax rate (MTR): 
(Graham, 1996b) analyses various proxies for true MTR, these are taxable income dummy, 
net operating loss dummy, trichotomous variable, statutory tax rate etc:. The author aims to 
find and analyse other easy to calculate alternatives for simulated MTR due to the complexity 
involved in its calculation. Author concludes that simulated rate is the best proxy for the 
MTR followed by statutory tax rate, taxable income dummy, and the trichotomous variable. 
The problem with the tax variable is that it is highly endogenous in nature; (Graham, 
Lemmon, & Schallheim, 1998) proposes to use forward looking before financing MTR to 
solve this issue. 
In this paper MTR is calculated using the MATLAB code developed in (Sinha & Bansal, 
2012). The MATLAB code is developed for algorithms based on the Graham – Shevlin 
methodology. (Shevlin, 1990) forecasts future incomes based on managers’ expectations. The 
author proxy manager’s expectation by suggesting that pre tax income follows random walk 
with drift and thus, generates simulated future pre tax income to integrate loss carry back and 
carry forward feature. (Graham, 1996a) elaborates on the algorithm to integrate alternate 
minimum tax and investment tax credits to arrive at MTR. (Sinha & Bansal, 2012) modifies 
the above algorithm to incorporate Indian tax rules regarding loss carry forward and 
minimum alternate tax and develops MATLAB code undertaking 10,000 simulations to 
arrive at the final figure of MTR. The authors suggest an alternate algorithm. Both the 
algorithms are similar to each other with the difference only in the part of series being 
simulated. In Algorithm1 the whole taxable income series is simulated and then the tax rules 
are applied to calculate marginal tax rate. In Algorithm 2 only the future stream of taxable 
income series is simulated.  
Thus we have used four variants of MTR in our study. These variations are based on two 
differences. One difference is based on the type of underlying series used to calculate MTR 
and other one on the type of algorithm (Sinha & Bansal, 2012). Thus four measures of MTR 
are MTRA1, MTRA2, MTREA1 and MTREA2. The first two are based on profit before 
taxes and the other two are based on earnings before interest and taxes. 1 & 2 signifies the 
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type of algorithm used to calculate MTR. We have used one year lagged values of MTR for 
the purpose of our analyses. Each MTR is used in a separate model. 
Firms facing high MTR are expected to have higher levels of debt. This hypothesis is based 
on the trade off theory of capital structure.  
 
ii) Non debt tax shield (CNDTS): 
Presence of deductions such as depreciation and amortization have an effect of reducing the 
tax burden on the firm and thus, are expected to influence debt issuance (DeAngelo & 
Masulis, 1980) .The variable has been calculated by dividing the first difference in 
depreciation by lagged value of total assets. As explained above, the presence of non debt tax 
shield have an effect of reducing the marginal tax rate, thus firms having high levels of 
NDTS are expected to have lower levels of debt. 
 
iii) Other tax variables: 
To expect each manager to make decisions based on MTR is a very unrealistic assumption 
Graham (1996a). Thus based upon the availability of data, few other tax variables have been 
included in the model to check and separate their autonomous effect, if any. These are tax 
difference, taxable income dummy and effective tax rate. These variables have been used 
earlier in different studies. 
Tax difference is calculated by deducting MTR from statutory tax rate. Therefore, if 
managers consider statutory tax rate to take the decision, higher debt figures would be 
observed for companies having larger tax differences. We have considered four measures of 
tax difference, TDIFA1, TDIFA2, TDIFEA1, TDIFEA2 each based on a separate MTR. Each 
tax difference variable is used in a separate model along with the relevant MTR. We have 
used the lagged values of this variable. 
Taxable income (TI) is a dummy that takes a value 1 if there are profits before tax and takes a 
value 0 if there are losses. Many studies have used effective tax rate (EFFT) as a proxy for 
statutory tax rate. The common measure used for EFFT is taxes paid by profit before taxes. 
We have used the lagged values of both of these variables. Both TI and EFFT are expected to 
have positive coefficients.      
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4.2.2. Other control variables: 
To understand the influence of tax on debt, it is important to test and separate the effect of 
other variables which have an apparent influence on debt figures of companies. Thus 
following control variables have been considered in the study: 
i). Financial Distress (BRISK): The trade off theory suggests that there are both advantages 
and disadvantages attached to the issuance of debt. Beyond a certain level, debt becomes 
risky as default in the payment of principal or interest may put the company in financial 
distress and increase the probability of bankruptcy. Long back Altman (1968) calculated a 
discriminant function predictor of bankruptcies, ZPROB. (Graham, 1996a) and (Alworth & 
Arachi, 2001) have used its variant, BRISK in their study to measure the costs of financial 
distress. Brisk is calculated as total assets divided by the sum of 3.3 times EBIT, sales, 1.4 
times shareholder’s funds and 1.2 times working capital. We have also used the same 
measure in our study. Companies experiencing continuous losses or financial distress are 
expected to issue less or no debt due to their inability to pay interest and decreasing 
creditworthiness. 
ii). Excess return on total assets (ERTA): This is a measure of retained earnings. Pecking 
order theory suggests that the managers follow an order when they need new capital.  It 
suggets that their first preference is retained earnings, followed by debt and then equity.  
Retained earnings are understood to be an easy and cheap source of finance because they are 
free from issuance costs.  Thus, its impact on new debt issue is obvious and known. In most 
of the studies its effect is captured within profitability factor. But higher profits do not imply 
higher retained earnings. Moreover, there are different schools of thought on profitability 
factor, and accordingly profitable firms may be found to have higher or lower levels of debt.  
Thus it is very important to test the effect of retained earnings separately. Its importance is 
also highlighted in case of India through Figure 3 section 4.1 above.  The measure of retained 
earnings that we have used in our study has not been used earlier in any research as per our 
knowledge. It is calculated by first deducting dividend from profit after taxes and then 
dividing the remainder by total assets. The relationship of retained earnings (unlike 
profitability) with debt is obvious; firms having higher levels of retained earnings are 
expected to have lower levels of debt 
iii). Deviation from average debt to asset ratio (DADAR): Study of capital structure changes 
in a firm over multiple periods leads to dynamic trade off theory. According to it a firm tries 
to maintain some target debt to asset ratio, but maintaining such a ratio is costly for a firm 
due to the presence of restructuring costs, tested by (Bhaduri, 2002) for India also. (Kane, 
Marcus, & McDonald, 1984) and (Brennan & Schwartz, 1984) for the first time proposed that 
firms have a range or debt corridor within which its debt ratios would fluctuate. This is also 
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visible in figure 4 above; wherein the ratio is moving around 70%. Thus deviations from this 
ratio are expected to affect capital structure decisions. Here we have considered the deviation 
from average debt to asset ratio (DADAR) and deviation from average debt to capital 
employed ratio (DADAR 1) to capture this effect (also refer Figure 3 section4.1). DADAR is 
used in the model which contains DAR and DINC as the dependent variable and DADAR 1 
is used in the model containing DAR 1. Firms having debt ratios higher than the average 
ratios are expected to issue less debt.   
iv). SIZE (CSIZ): Capital requirements vary depending upon the size of operations. Size 
definitely impacts the amount of funds required by the business but it may not necessarily 
affect debt ratios. Thus this variable may or may not affect the particular capital ratio. The 
two most commonly used measures of size are log of sales and log of assets. We have 
measured its effect through log of assets. If it is found significant; this variable is expected to 
have a positive coefficient. 
v). Growth opportunities (GRW) : Growing firms or firms having higher growth 
opportunities would require greater amount of funds but this may or may not trigger debt 
issuance. The new projects may be financed through any source depending upon the riskiness 
of the project. It may not be a wise decision to finance a very risky investment through a 
source entailing fixed payment. So to assess its impact in India we have included this factor 
in our study. This factor is measured as percentage change in sales each year. Growing firms 
may or may not have higher debt ratios. 
vi). Collaterability (COL): This factor reflects capability of the business to support additional 
debt with fixed assets which can be kept as collateral security. This factor stems from the 
agency theory of debt, it implies that companies which have higher assets have low agency 
cost of debt. In addition these companies are able to generate higher credit worthiness and 
thus, are expected to have higher debt. In this study it is measured as change in fixed assets 
divide by lagged value of total assets. It is expected to have a positive coefficient.  
vii). Free Cash Flow (FCF): Presence of free cash flows suggest abundance availability of 
internal capital, hence according to the pecking order theory we expect companies, generating 
high levels of free cash flow regularly, to have lower levels of debt. It is measured as Total of 
cash and non committed bank balance, whole divided by total assets. 
Based on the dependent and the independent variables discussed we have constructed 12 
models to test various objectives. Under each dependent variable, there are four specifications 
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A, B, C and D. Models are differentiated on the basis of variants of MTR and respective tax 
differences (TDIF). Here we are presenting four models A, B, C, D with the dependent 
variable DAR or DINC or DAR1. Most of the right hand side equation (independent 
variables) would remain same only DADAR would be replaced by DADAR1 in model with 
DAR1 as dependent variable respectively. 
DARit / DINCit / DAR1it (A) = C + B1CNDTSit + B2MTRA1it + B3TDIFA1it + B4TIit + 
B5EFFTit + B6ERTAit + B7DADARit/DADAR1it + B8CSIZit + B9GRWit + B10COLit + B11FCFit 
+ B12BRISKit+ Eit                                                                                                                                                                            (1)                                                                                                                                   
DARit / DINCit / DAR1it (B) = C + B1CNDTSit + B2MTRA2it + B3TDIFA2it + B4TIit + 
B5EFFTit + B6ERTAit + B7DADARit/DADAR1it + B8CSIZit + B9GRWit + B10COLit + B11FCFit 
+ B12BRISKit+ Eit                                                                                                                                                                               (2)                                                                            
DARit / DINCit / DAR1it (C) = C + B1CNDTSit + B2MTREA1it + B3TDIFEA1it + B4TIit + 
B5EFFTit + B6ERTAit + B7DADARit/DADAR1it + B8CSIZit + B9GRWit + B10COLit + B11FCFit 
+ B12BRISKit+ Eit                                                                                                                     (3)  
DARit / DINCit / DAR1it (D) = C + B1CNDTSit + B2MTREA2it + B3TDIFEA2it + B4TIit + 
B5EFFTit + B6ERTAit + B7DADARit/DADAR1it + B8CSIZit + B9GRWit + B10COLit + B11FCFit 
+ B12BRISKit+ Eit                                                (4)                                                                 
Where: 
i = 1 to 234 (cross sections (firms)) 
t = 1990 to 2011 (22 time periods)                     
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5. The Data and Research methodology: 
 
 
Data for the sample has been collected form CMIE Prowess. CMIE contains financial data on 
around 20,000 domestic Indian companies. The data is available from 1989 onwards on 
quarterly-annual basis. We have extracted the relevant data from annual financial statements 
of companies.  
In our study, we have considered all those non financial manufacturing companies for which 
uninterrupted data for the period 1989-2011(23 years) is available. Initially 434 companies 
were shortlisted for the analysis. The selection was based upon 3 criteria. 
1) Profit before tax series of the company should be normally distributed; 
2) Data for all the indicators should be available from 1989-2011.  
3) The companies should be profitable on an average over the period of 1989-2011. 
After deducting the companies with missing values we were left with 234 companies. As 
per the third condition, we have undertaken analysis for only those companies for which the 
23 year average of profit before taxes figure was positive. Throughout the existing 
literature, we found profitability to be one of the important determinants of leverage. 
Generally, profitability factor bears a negative coefficient indicating that higher are the 
profits, lower are the leverage ratios. Although the results confirm to the trade off theory, 
but as per our understanding the relation between tax and debt may differ in profitable and 
loss making companies. Like we make a distinction between financial and non financial 
companies due to different tax treatments, similarly it is important to separate profitability 
effect to test the debt tax relation in different companies. 
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Figure 5: Chart showing total debt and number of loss making companies from 1989 to 2011. 
We propose that while studying the relationship between tax and debt we should undertake 
separate analysis for profitable and loss making companies. Figure 5 throws some light on 
this. The graph depicts the movement of total debt of all the 234 companies with the number 
of companies reporting loss (loss before tax) each year. Let us divide the total time in three 
periods, one from 1989 to1995, second from 1995 to 2001 and the third from 2004 to 2011. 
During the first period when number of loss making companies was consistently decreasing, 
debt was increasing at a consistent rate. During the second period, number of companies 
reporting loss first increased and then decreased sharply, during this phase debt was 
increasing but at a very slow pace. After 2002 it started decreasing, again at a very low rate. 
During the years 1999-2005, the rate of change in debt ranged from .33% to 8% and thus debt 
sometimes seems to remain constant in the second period. In the third period companies 
reporting loss remained below 20 and there was a steep rise in the total debt employed by the 
company.  
The basis for testing debt tax relationship is that debt has a tax advantage. We propose that a 
company which is in losses from sometime would try to decrease the debt so as to minimize 
fixed charges of capital (this might be one of the justifications for behaviour of debt in the 
second phase). There is a possibility that this company has a positive marginal tax rate due to 
the presence of minimum alternate tax or future expected profits. Since for such a company 
cost of financial distress and not MTR may be the crucial factor in capital structure decisions, 
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therefore there may be a lot of difference between the debt tax relations of two types of 
corporate. In this paper we have exclusively studied profitable companies.  
We have undertaken regression analyses using pooled cross sectional of differenced time 
series data for all the variables. All the series are stationary. The impact of tax and other 
independent variables on leverage policy is studied using linear regression analysis. Results 
of regressions are obtained in EVIEWS using least squares method. Standard errors are 
heteroskadastic - consistent and the problem of autocorrelation has been checked and 
resolved. 
 
6. Results and Observations: 
 
Table 2 (i) and (ii) presents the results of regression analysis.  
6.1. Comparison of models: 
Amongst the 12 regressions, the independent variables are explaining maximum amount 
(around 55%) of variation in DAR1 compared to around 44% in DINC and only around 17% 
in DAR. Also the coefficients of significant variables are the highest in models with DAR1 
dependent variable. The result flows from the observation of adjusted R square value.  
Under each dependent variable there are 4 specifications that vary on the basis of different 
MTR proxy and corresponding tax difference (TDIF). When compared from Adjusted R
2
 or 
AIC criterion all 4 specifications, under each dependent variable, seem equivalent.  
Variables EFFT and COL are not found significant in any of the specifications with DAR as 
the dependent variable. TI has a positive coefficient and is found to be significant only in the 
model containing MTRA2, this is the only model where tax difference is not found 
significant. Thus, in this model TI may be capturing the effect of statutary tax rate.  
TI and COL are not found to be significant in any of the models containing DINC as the 
dependent variable. Durbin Watson statistic indicated towards the problem of auto 
correlation, which was solved by using an AR term of first order.  Minor differences do exist 
amongst the four models only in terms of coefficients of the significant variables.  
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Variables TI, EFFT, CSIZ, GRW, COL, FCF AND BRISK are not found significant in any of 
the specification under DAR1 as the dependent variable. The results show that the change in 
ratio mainly depends upon tax variables, retained earnings and average debt to capital 
employed ratio. An important observation in these models is that all the significant variables 
have larger impact (as measured by coefficients) on the dependent variable (DAR1) in 
comparison to other models.  
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Table 2 (i): Regression results of 12 models with 3 dependent variables (each with 4 different specifications), part (i) showing regression estimates for tax factors causing 
leverage changes.   
*   Shows significance at 1%                ** Shows significance at 5% 
 
 
  
Dependent 
Variable (->) 
DARit DINCit Dar1it 
VARIABLES A B C D A B C D A B C D 
C -0.025432 -0.012356 -0.025501 -0.027932 0.009386 0.006969 0.005630 0.001445 -0.173042 -0.137878 -0.177310 -0.114910 
TAX VARIABLES 
CNDTSit 0.768813* 0.752169* 0.767598* 0.766336* 0.772261* 0.762656* 0.770392* 0.767650* 2.384713* 2.370441* 2.380872* 2.449695* 
MTRA1it 0.139331* NA NA NA 0.078401 NA NA NA 1.162642* NA NA NA 
MTRA2it NA 0.144686* NA NA NA 0.155152* NA NA NA 1.046065* NA NA 
MTREA1it NA NA 0.144597* NA NA NA 0.122002** NA NA NA 1.138525* NA 
MTREA2it NA NA NA 0.143899* NA NA NA 0.152576* NA NA NA 1.033836* 
TDIFA1it 0.150796* NA NA NA 0.240896* NA NA NA 0.806490* NA NA NA 
TDIFA2it NA 0.046442 NA NA NA 0.099684 NA NA NA 0.778736 NA NA 
TDIFEA1it NA NA 0.141574* NA NA NA 0.189470* NA NA NA 0.865463* NA 
TDIFEA2it NA NA NA 0.205713* NA NA NA 0.159970 NA NA NA -0.429132 
TIit 
-0.003019 
-
0.017095** -0.003073 -0.000898 0.006016 -0.002198 0.005944 0.005337 -0.025415 -0.063611 -0.028120 -0.076061 
EFFTit -0.003076 -0.00508 -0.0034 -0.003087 -0.018635* -0.022820* -0.021130* -0.021754* -0.018081 -0.014353 -0.012571 -0.016277 
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Dependent 
Variable (->) 
DARit DINCit Dar1it 
Variables A B C D A B C D A B C D 
Control variables 
ERTAit 
-0.23827* -0.248118* -0.239793* -0.229608* -0.286469* -0.308181* -0.298253* -0.300180* -2.268496* -2.258602* -2.244335* -2.475338* 
DADARit 
-0.278071* -0.27647* -0.27846* -0.278629* -0.295566* -0.298419* -0.300664* -0.302511* NA NA NA NA 
DADAR1it NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA -1.107821* -1.107379* -1.107655* -1.108827* 
CSIZit 0.07332* 0.072389* 0.073026* 0.072864* 0.500802* 0.497292* 0.499106* 0.497298* -0.005376 -0.001297 -0.006226 0.006481 
GRWit 
-0.031361* -0.030783* -0.031486* -0.031463* 
-
0.024754** 
-
0.025402** 
-
0.025342** 
-
0.025616** -0.051500 -0.046005 -0.050035 -0.047950 
Colit -0.019303 -0.019048 -0.018996 -0.019025 -0.003274 -0.000742 -0.001364 -0.000903 0.120861 0.112803 0.115833 0.113164 
FCFit 
-0.681675** 
-
0.636443** 
-
0.686639** 
-
0.694831** -1.575147* -1.535729* -1.586412* -1.585874* -2.691509 -2.455569 -2.643538 -2.381681 
BRISK 
0.00266* 0.002713* 0.002676* 0.002693* 0.002381* 0.002558* 0.002513* 0.002529* -0.016794 -0.017181 -0.017190 -0.017744 
AR(1) NA NA NA NA 0.146512* 0.147106* 0.150536* 0.151681* NA NA NA NA 
Other Statistics 
R2 
0.173128 0.174813 0.17309 0.173394 0.446125 0.443790 0.444055 0.443585 0.555198 0.555092 0.555141 0.555727 
Adjusted R2 
0.171195 0.172885 0.171158 0.171462 0.444655 0.442314 0.442580 0.442109 0.554159 0.554052 0.554101 0.554689 
F-statistic 
89.5958* 90.65297* 89.57223* 89.76244* 303.5969* 300.7396* 301.0628* 300.4902* 534.1225* 533.8922* 533.9980* 535.2678* 
Durbin-
Watson stat 
2.016534 2.027935 2.016324 2.013534 1.989175 1.988080 1.989135 1.988932 2.066116 2.066912 2.066428 2.069707 
AIC 
-2.174386 -2.176427 -2.174341 -2.174708 -1.706127 -1.701919 -1.702396 -1.701551 2.727495 2.727734 2.727624 2.726305 
 
Table 2 (ii): Regression results of 12 models with 3 dependent variables (each with 4 different specifications), part (ii) showing regression estimates for control factors 
causing leverage changes.   
*   Shows significance at 1%                        ** Shows significance at 5% 
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6.2. Discussion of variables: 
Some of the variables which are significant in all the specifications are CNDTS, MTR 
(except MTRA1 in one model), TDIFA1, TDIFA2, ERTA and DADAR.  TI (except in one 
model) and COL are the only variables which are not significant in any of the models.  
Wherever significant, CNDTS, TI (except in one model) and EFFT are those exceptions 
which do not bear the hypothesized signs. We have divided the discussion on variables in two 
parts; first part will describe the results on tax variables and the other part on control 
variables.  
6.2.1 Tax effects: 
The results show significant tax effects on all the measures of leverage. Tax effects are 
consistently and mainly captured through MTR. MTR is highly significant except MTRA1 
which is not found to be significant in model containing DINC as the dependent variable. 
TDIFA2 is not significant in any of the models and TDIFEA2 is found significant only in 
model containing DAR as the dependent variable. The difference in results is due to the 
different algorithms used to calculate MTR. The results based on algorithm 2 shows that 
companies consider MTR and not statutory tax rate to take debt decisions. CNDTS is found 
significant in all models but it does not bear the hypothesized sign. Further, wherever 
significant, EFFT bears the opposite sign; this is where the important difference between 
MTR and other tax proxies arise. MTR has always depicted the true relation in all the studies 
conducted till date.  
Thus the hypothesized relation between tax variables and leverage is mainly and correctly 
depicted only through MTR and TDIF or TI. 
 
6.2.2 Effect of other control variables: 
ERTA and DADAR are significant in all the models and bear the hypothesized signs. CSIZ, 
BRISK, GRW and FCF are also significant factors influencing DAR and DINC ratios; 
statistical results show that there is not enough evidence that these factors influence DAR1. 
DINC ratios are highly auto regressive.  
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7. Findings and Recommendations: 
 
Although our results suggest significant tax effects on all the measures of leverage but some 
differences exist under different leverage ratios. When compared by adjusted R square 
criterion, variables employed in the study explain maximum variation in DAR 1 (group of 
models). Our results, thus, support the proposition made by (Welch, 2011).When we study 
the behaviour of corporate towards tax advantage of debt, we are mainly concerned with 
company’s actions regarding issue of new capital. Thus, company that is facing high MTR 
has greater chances of issuing debt when a need of fresh capital arises. As company needs 
external capital, it would issue either debt or equity or would employ any other source. 
Accordingly, this action of a company would very well be reflected in change in debt to 
capital employed ratio (DAR 1) as against incremental debt to total assets ratio (DINC) (or to 
any other denominator depicting the value of the firm) or DAR. This measure is better than 
debt to equity ratio too, as it captures company’s actions with respect to only debt or equity, 
wherein company may employ any other source also. According to us, DAR 1 would capture 
all the actions of the company, whether they are related to issue of new or redemption of 
existing capital and thus would prove to be the best measure to study capital structure 
changes. In this study as well, all the significant variables are able to explain the maximum 
(around 55%) variation in DAR 1. Hence our results support the proposition made by (Welch, 
2011).  
Under each dependent variable, there are four specifications based on different proxies used 
for MTR. AIC criterion and adjusted R square shows that there is a minor difference between 
the models, but unlike the results achieved in (Alworth & Arachi, 2001), we see that 
coefficients of MTR under each specification is different.  
Contrary to the hypotheses, results report positive coefficient on CNDTS and negative 
coefficients on EFFT. Results of CNDTS very well support Mackie Mason’s claim. 
According to him high levels of non debt tax shield will not affect the profitable firms 
negatively, it will burden only those firms which are near tax exhaustion (Mackie-Mason, 
1990). EFFT may not be carrying the correct signs as it may be capturing the effects of 
profitability, which is expected to bear negative coefficient. 
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ERTA is significant at 1% level of significance and bears the expected sign suggesting that 
managers in India follow pecking order theory. As per our knowledge, this is a new measure 
of retained earnings used, to study leverage changes, and has contributed in improving our 
understanding of capital structure decisions in corporate. DADAR and DADAR1 are also 
found significant at 1% level of significance justifying the trade off theory the results support 
our dynamic trade off theory. Both these results support our observations in figure 3.   
8. Limitations and scope for future research: 
 
Our study is no exception when it comes to limitations. Access to tax related data is an issue 
in most of the countries. In India, taxable income of corporate, calculated as per Income Tax 
Act 1961 is not accessible. Hence we have employed book profits for all our tax related 
indicators. We expect the results may improve and a better and more precise value of MTR 
may be available if such information is available.  
In the presence of appropriate data, total debt may be divided into debt from banks, financial 
institutions, short term, long term to gain a deeper insight into the determinants of capital 
structure decisions, and more precisely debt tax relationships. In India, such division is not 
available for such a long period of time.  
9. Conclusion:   
 
Apart from solving the capital structure mystery, it is very important to understand whether 
managers consider tax related features of a particular source of finance or not. All other 
factors which affect capital structure are internal to an organisation, only tax is one of the 
factors which may be exogenously determined and used to control company’s actions to 
some extent. (De Mooij, 2011) mentions that although existence of debt in the capital 
structure is not a cause of the financial crises but since excessive leverage makes firms more 
vulnerable to economic shocks, debt biasness might have contributed to the deepness of the 
crises. Thus, all over the world tax authorities are now considering a proposal to alter their 
tax policies so as to reduce the tax biasness in favour of debt. 
In this paper we have run the regression analysis for 12 models based on three measures of 
leverage as dependent variable and four variants of MTR under each dependent variable. We 
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have employed MTR (tax proxy) based on Graham – Shevlin methodology. We found 
significant tax effects on all measures of leverage. Debt to capital employed ratio (DAR1), a 
measure of leverage, proposed by (Welch, 2011) is identified to be more suitable; commonly 
used independent variables are able to explain around 55% variation in this measure (adjusted 
R square value is quiet high when compared with similar studies). As against change in debt 
to asset (DAR) or change in debt to capital employed (DAR 1) ratios, measure employing 
incremental debt (DINC) is found to be auto regressive. This is in contradiction with the 
observations of (Mackie-Mason, 1990). ERTA, a new proposed measure of retained earnings 
is also found to be highly significant in our study and supports the implications of pecking 
order theory. The There exists a huge potential of research in this area, despite the fact that a 
lot of work has already been done, and is going on in various countries to solve the 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE PUZZLE. 
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